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Showing posts with label KIM Jong-il. Show all posts
Showing posts with label KIM Jong-il. Show all posts

Thursday, December 17, 2015

Four More Years?

Four years after the passing of his dad KIM Jong-il, KIM Jong-un celebrates the end of his first term as DONK (Dictator Of North Korea).

So far, his reelection campaign looks much quieter, and barely less bloody, than the GOP primaries.


Breaking: Kim Jong-un declares war to Donald Trump (20150821 - twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/634558694936604672)

So between two rumored purges, KJU can try to improve his limited skills in international affairs, where this Dr. Evil looks more like a Mini-me.

Particularly after a year marked by face-losing moments with China: North Korean envoys getting folding chairs far from the V.I.P.s during the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, Chinese top brass deciding to not attend the Moranbong concert... So much for Pander Diplomacy: did KJU really think that sending his former girlfriend's band would buy him a ticket to Beijing? and did he have to drop that H-Bomb remark at that moment?

Exclusive: here's the technical schema of North Korea's H-Bomb (20151210 poktanju - twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/674879744454725632)

2015 was also marked with further pressure from the U.N. on Human Rights issues, and a non-visit by its Secretary General. Resorting to more classic Baekdu-style diplomacy, KJU seems to have sent a formal invitation to BAN Ki-moon by sentencing Canadian pastor LIM Hyeon-soo to a life sentence.

Anyway, expect more weird messages from beyond the DMZ. Preferably not as macabre as those ghost ships drifting towards Japanese shores...


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Thursday, November 27, 2014

KIM Yo-jong - cherchez la femme

We've been flooded with interesting Baekduology updates regarding the women surrounding KIM Jong-un lately - and even before his 40-day 'ankle-management' hiatus (to which we'll return later).

Here's the latest score:
  • KJU's ex: HYON Song-wol reappeared last May on local TV, proving that reports of her death were an exaggeration, and suggesting that rumors of her involvement in debauched videos were probably not that trustworthy either. 
  • KJU's aunt: a defector says that KIM Kyong-hui committed suicide shortly after the execution of her husband JANG Sung-taek. Her poison: whisky, as usual?
  • KJU's wife: RI Sol-ju is not as visible as she used to. Maybe her bling-bling outfits contrast too much with lil' sis' Yo-jong's vintage Baekduwear. Anyway, in this family, giving birth to a potential heir doesn't guarantee anything for the future.
  • KJU's daughter: 2 year-old KIM Ju-ae is too small to ride a white horse, hold a notebook, or even study in Switzerland.
  • KJU's sister: when KIM Jong-un was under media radar, rumors had it KIM Yo-jong was running the show. She's got the Baekdu bloodline and even the Baekdu clothesline. Newly wed, enjoying new prestigious jobs, and a lot of attention from the propaganda, lil' sis' seems to have become more than just the most politically correct female figure to exhibit these days.
So is KIM Yo-jong the next Dear Leader or just a Cheer Leader? Kim The Fourth or Jang The Second? Let's unhearth a few tweets and links.


Clap along if you feel like Ri Sol-ju's an ambitious girl


Clap along if you feel like Kim Yo-jong's running the show
 *
KIM Jo-young the next Dear Leader of just a Cheer Leader?

KIM Yo-jong's rise mechanically helps Kim The Third become Kim The Elder, a father figure. Not just that isolated brat who got his uncle and aunt removed, not just the potential last ruler of the dynasty.

At this stage, KYJ is not portrayed as a next-in-line. She's in the background, trailing behind, more cheerleading than leading. But at least she's in the picture, unlike poor bro KIM Jong-chul, who anyway has never been the one wearing the trousers in this litter of baby dictators (or holding Uncle Jang at gunpoint?).


Among Kim Jong-un's servile notetakers, his sister Kim Yo-jong (in today's Rodong Sinmun via @pearswick) - 20141127 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/537752025274925056
Yo sista got minista! Kim Jong-un's sister Kim Yo-jong, here in her Kim Jong-il-blue best: "N.K. leader’s sister granted official post" - 20141128 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/538168596174626818
Kim Yo-jong behind her brother Kim Jong-un, looking elsewhere. In North Korea, military first goes with family first - 20140311 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/443200177063460864
Still, in case of emergency, the propaganda can always pull out an old picture where KYJ appears directly at the same level as her dad. Kim Jong-un would need Photoshop to produce this kind of shots:
Kim Yo-jong can not only wear Kim-Jong-il-style clothes, but also ride a white horse Baekdu-style with her dad - 20141128 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/538177527290671104
Meanwhile, in the much more advanced South Korea (where the leader is already the daughter of a dictator), mainstream media are multiplying covers featuring Park Geun-hye in KJUesquely odd photo ops:


In South Korea too, the leader makes all covers smiling in odd photo ops (Park Geun-hye with guitar, with giant screen...) - 20141128 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/538131845364203520

*
 KIM Jo-young: Kim The Fourth of Jang The Second?

KJY conveniently fills many shoes at the same time: aunt Kyong-hui is gone? here's a new female, blue-blood presence - uncle Jang is out? here's someone more trustable who can take care of cash machines. And she's married to authorities, party friendly... If these guys cut a whole branch of the family tree, they made sure the main one filled the gap.


Kim Jong-un's sister (and fellow horse rider) Kim Yeo-jong gets key power-giver post in party: "Kim Jong-un's Sister 'Given Key Party Post'" - 20130722 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/359146697454137345


Baekdu Bank? Kim Jong-un's sister Kim Yeo-jong in charge of currency-earning agencies in Workers Party: "Kim Jong-un's Sister Put in Charge of Regime's Coffers" - 20130114 - twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/422566341132820480


North Korea defector says Kim Jong-un aunt Kim Kyong-hui killed herself ("Defector: Kim Jong Un’s Aunt Killed Herself Last Year"). With which poison? Whisky? - 20141125 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/537535971625947136


Meanwhile, Comrade KimYeo-jong gets first Warholian moments in DPRK propaganda: "Kim Jong-un's Sister Secures Place in Nomenklatura" - 20140310 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/442825248996458496


Aunt Kim Kyong-hui loses seat in parliament, sis Kim Yo-jong's in charge of Kim Jong-un's hairdo, elevator shoes ("Kim Jong-un’s peculiar sister gains prominence") - 20140314 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/444280375129288705


Piggy's sis got married: Kim Jong-un's sister Kim Yeo-jong tied to top North Korea official (Room 39 or security): "Kim Jong-un's sister weds key official"- 20141029 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/527272632672980992


Kim The Fourth? Kim Jong-un's lil' sis' Kim Yo-jong gets North Korea propaganda favors, high profile job (" Young sister of North Korean leader takes senior party post: KCNA" @pearswick) - 20141127 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/537884688371576832


*

Like it or not, for the moment, 'all roads lead to Comrade Kim Yo-jong':
'All roads lead to Comrade Yo Jong', North Korea's new 'princess' ("North Korea's 'princess' moves closer to center of power" by @pearswick) - 20141128 twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/538172764603949056


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Tuesday, August 27, 2013

KIM Han-sol - Episode IV, Striking Back At The Empire?

KIM Han-sol will study political sciences in Sciences Po Le Havre  (see "Un petit-fils de Kim Jong-il à Sciences po" (20130827 - L'Express).

The first time KIM Jong-nam's son (KIM Jong-un's nephew, KIM Jong-il's grandson, KIM Il-sung's great-grandson - NB: nothing to do with KIM Yu-na) made the world headlines was when he distanced himself from the North Korean dictatorship as Elisabeth REHN interviewed him for Yle, Finland's public broadcasting company (see videos below):







The teenager was then studying at the Mostar campus of United World College because Hong-Kong authorities didn't grant him a student visa, and BIH was a friendlier destination. Han-sol had less trouble living in another SAR, Macau, where his dad majored in Gambling magna cum laude, with an exchange student experience at Tokyo Disneyland University, and a Master's Degree in Fashion Disasters.

KIM Han-sol will not study at the main Sciences Po, the prestigious IEP Paris, Rue Saint-Guillaume. But Le Havre campus does makes sense: that's the one devoted to Europe-Asia, all courses are delivered in English, and there's even a Korean language program.

The main news, of course, is that a fourth generation KIM is venturing into politics, and for the first time, with notions of actual democracy reaching beyond the experience of life in a Western democracy.

And if you don't like KIM Han-sol's ear piercing, that's another positive leap forward from the previous generation:

KIM Jong-nam majored in Gambling magna cum laude at Macau International School of Jokers, was an exchange student experience at Tokyo Disneyland University, and got a Master's Degree in Fashion Disasters



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Sunday, July 21, 2013

Beyond Containment: Andrei Lankov On Stage (10 Magazine Book Club)

Over the past few months, Andrei Nikolaevich LANKOV has been everywhere, on every network. The Russian expert of North Korea even had to join Twitter under media pressure (yes, the voluble LANKOV restricted to 140 characters, that's possible, and that's on @AndreiLankov).

Granted, for the release of his latest book, "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia"*, he did receive the hell of a boost from KIM Jong-un, but LANKOV doesn't need anybody's help to become a media darling: this man doesn't even use kid gloves to handle the most fissile materials, and nuclear countdowns have never been that fun watching ever since Peter Sellers brought the house down in Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove".

Yesterday, the showman was on stage in Myeong-dong for Barry Welsh's 10 Magazine Book Club, and he tirelessly explored every square inch of it with mickjaggeresque energy - barely pausing for a sip of tea now and then to fuel his own reactor.

Does Andrei Lankov rock & roll? You bet!
twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/358831263123111936

A pundit of the "pound it" variety, LANKOV can not only dance like a butterfly and sting like a bee, but also crack the audience up with outrageous wit ("Human Rights did improve under KIM Jong-un: from unbelievingly bad to exceptionally bad" / "Most defectors from North Korea are 40-50 year-old ajumma - in the Soviet Union, it used to be young and smart Jewish chess players").

Kim Il-sung trying to stop Andrei Lankov, in vain. Great show at @10MagBookClub todaytwitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/358883923025092608

Impossible to sum up a show that covered a remarquable scope considering the limited time (one hour presentation, one hour Q and A). Just a few insights:
  • It was easier to reduce the military's economic influence than to tame private entrepreneurship. The rising class of private entrepreneurs is seen as a threat by the party nomenklatura, less apt to survive in case of change. At this stage, neither sees their shared interest. LANKOV doesn't believe in a coup. The only underground he sees is the not very impressive Christian one. (NB: beyond the scenario of an organized coup, many things can happen, from an individual going rogue to KJU choking tomorrow on a pretzel.)
  • (About what I called the "Hanschluss scenario") LANKOV does consider the scenario of a puppet regime controled by Beijing, but only a "open" one that would happen after the collapse of the regime and a military intervention of China. Needless to say, that would not be well perceived by North Koreans, who would then blame Beijing for anything going wrong.
  • North Korea remains very rational. LANKOV doesn't think KJU marked a disruption (NB: I agree in substance but not in style - if he does keep both the "Juche Line" and "Beijing Line" parties sweet following his dad's guidelines, he ruined everything with his lack of patience, alienating key supporters in China**)
  • The very existence of a successful South Korea can become a hindrance for evolution. A country like China could carry out significant reforms, but "where is South China?" (NB: AL logically considers Taiwan's impact as limited at the economic level, the difference in wealth being 3 times compared to up to 40 between both Koreas - furthermore Taiwan is relatively tiny. A question from the audience stressed the political importance of even tiny Taiwan as a democratic model)
  • Internet: LANKOV wouldn't be surprised to see the world wide web partially accessible in a near future. The risks are obvious, but control technologies have considerably improved, and the risk of lagging too far behind is even greater.
  • Reunification: many North Koreans see it through rose-colored glasses, thinking South Koreans are eagerly looking forward to it, and that economic problems would be solved within a couple of years.
  • ...


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* "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia"
Oxford University Press - April 2013
** "This Time Is Different - Six Decades of North Korean Follies (The Umpteenth Final Countdown)"
*** "Game over for the 'Hanschluss' scenario?"

Monday, March 25, 2013

This Time Is Different - Six Decades of North Korean Follies (The Umpteenth Final Countdown)


Nuclear threats, cyberattacks, rumors of coups and collapse up North, the end is nigher than ever, repent, and don't forget to update your V3 antivirus before their V2 rockets rain down... We've seen that drama before, particularly in KOR/US military drill season.

Yet at the same time, and to anti-paraphrase the Reinhart-Rogoff post-Lehman bestseller "This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly", we're as always tempted to think "this time, that's it", the gimchi will really hit the fan, the North Korean regime is done.

Now China joining the US and South Korea in a united front, that could be a game changer.


1) KIM Jong-un has achieved little more than using up the arsenal of war premilinaries....:

There's not much he can do to top himself, except pushing the red button:
  • Rethoric-wise, KIM The Third has already reached Armageddon territories: the ceasefire is already over (almost), the Red Telephone is already cut (but still working), and America is already going up in flames (on YouTube videos). Now KIM The Third seems prisoner of his own PR, supported by a zimbabwean inflation in provocations and an almost constant red alert mode even his daddy didn't need. And it took KIM The Second four years to claim all key powers, he a much more trained and legitimate heir who'd been around long before the founder of the dynasty passed away.
  • Military-wise, Jong-un has already bombed South Korean land (see "We need to talk about KIM"). To top that, he needs either a bigger target, or bigger bombs...
  • Nuclear-wise, Junior went beyond dad's "Jucheterrence" by betting all on the missile and nuclear programs. He announced more trials but basically, the message has already been transmitted. And if he doesn't show spectacular improvements next time, local supporters might cool down. Considering the country's limited resources, "if the North Korean regime doesn't renounce the program, North Korean elites will eventually renounce the regime - unless one of the regime's last friends steps in and does it all by itself" (see "Hell is other Democratic People's Republic of Korea").
  • Cyberwar-wise, there's still room for manoeuvre. Whoever carried out last week's attacks*, they delivered a clear warning about how far they could reach: we can disrupt your media and finance sectors, we used your security system to do that, and we even left a message to let you know that it was just a small IED left by the weakest elements of our infantry, nothing compared to the waves that will follow (the "Hastati" reference). It works and it's cheap, but unless a full-fledged cyber attack is lauched, that truly cripples the South ahead of a real offensive, these operations will appear like recurrent drills to train response teams.
  • A Nukie Monster for Baby Kim?
  • More conventional asymetric warfare? Abductions, sabotage, terror, guerilla? Not very expensive either, but been there, done that. And North Korea would somehow lose its standing as a rogue nuclear nation. Furthermore, maintaining sleeping cells below radar surface isn't that easy with fake defectors actually defecting to the South (or to China).

2) ... and alienating his last allies:

The regim seems weaker than ever at home:
  • Compared to North Korea's doomsday arsenal, the international community's rudimentary weapons seem to have significantly hurt the regime. Pyongyang has more trouble funnelling illegal funds into the country, and the nasty business model of North Korea Inc, or rather North Korea Offshore Unlimited, has been fully exposed in South Korean media, including the way "diplomats" spend their time traveling or visiting casinos to get rid of counterfeit money by small bundles**. 
  • That money is paramount for a regime that needs to corrupt at home as well, to keep full support from the military and a nomenclatura... and they have learned how to develop their own illegal sources of income. Recurrent purges or calls for denounciations cannot solve everything now that almost two million individuals have a cellphone. Even foreigners can use one now.
  • Like his dad, KIM Jong-un is rumored to have survived at least one assassination attempt. If repression and fear remains, full containment and trust belong to the past.
And NK's top sponsor Beijing is moving closer to the rest of the international community:
  • China does continues to provide food and energy, to allow transfers from friendly banks, and to send defectors back to the North (particularly when they're soldiers, like recently), but it supported significant UN sanctions, along with Russia***.
  • China also started to control closely North Korean restaurants in the country. This may seem trivial, but restaurants are a key entry point for illegal workers and imports, and a steady source of undeclared currencies. NB: I presume propaganda is not threatened by the crack down - the closest thing to a trip to North Korea I ever experienced was not in the DMZ, but in a restaurant where patrons fully dressed in NK army uniforms karaoked on a song to the Dear Leader before the dinner.
  • XI Jinping seems definitely more open to collaboration with the South and the West than HU Jintao, a hardliner I considered more sympathetic to Northeastern Project / "Hanschluss"**** approaches. XI's past in the US is well documented, but we only recently learned that he'd met PARK Geun-hye back in 2005, a meeting that wouldn't have happened hadn't a PARK aide told her this Zhejiang official was likely to become the next top guy. XI wanted to know more about the Saemaeul movement, but PARK seized the opportunity to raise the North Korean issue, saying China should reconsider its position versus the regime.

3) A united front, now - a game changer?

In a perfectly orchestrated way, key messages have just been issued by China, South Korea, and the US:
  • For the first time, China agreed to join multinational maritime drill next year, along with the US, South Korea, or Japan. In spite of all other geopolitical and territorial tensions in the region. Sixty years after the Korean War, that's really big.
  • For the first time, South Korea and the US have exposed their counterattack plan. Korea would lead, and the US add their forces only if needed. They've been very specific when they mentioned the "provocations" that would lead to a full-fledged response: "violation of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime border; shelling the northernmost islands in South Korea’s Yellow Sea; infiltration by low-flying fighter jets into the South’s territory; infiltration by special forces of North Korea through the front-line units; surgical clashes between the two Koreas near the Military Demarcation Line; and torpedoing South Korean submarines" (see "U.S., South agree on joint counterattack" - Korea JoongAng Daily 20130325). IMHO that's too specific: technically, NK can still harpoon South Korean submarines. Likewise, now that KOR/US have pledged to destroy statues of KIM Il-sung and KIM Jong-il across the nation as priority targets to send the message to the population that regime change has come, you can be sure flocks of human shields will "spontaneously" wrap themselves around the effigies of their "beloved" tyrants.

More than ever, China holds the key. And KIM Jong-un has no choice but to negociate. He shot his last dud with his last nuclear trial ("Release the NKraken"), but the more he waits, the more surely he'll fall.

Time for the Nukie Monster to consider an exile from the Kermit Kingdom to Rodmanistan?


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* presumably from North Korea, following a supposed "false flag": Pyongyang claimed to be victim of a cyber attack from Seoul and Washington.
** see for instance "How N.Korean Diplomats Launder Counterfeit Money"
*** Note that neither Russia nor China had their say in the recent creation of a human rights commission, which will build the case against North Korea abuses, a potential first step towards the International Criminal Court which may help members of the elite up North distance themselves from the most rotten apples.
**** see for instance "China-North Korea : the Great Hanschluss still the base case scenario"

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Wonsu me

Two days after the "removal" of top brass RI Yong-ho (see "Pyongyang's Fairy Tales"), KIM Jong-un has officially been named "Wonsu", some sort of a Super-Marshal. To make that possible, Daddy KIM Jong-il had to be posthumously promoted to "Dae Wonsu", the Capo di tutti capi military-wise, a position only KIM Il-sung claimed before.

Definitely in the fast lane to NK Army superstardom ever since KIM The Second had his stroke, KIM The Third theoretically controls the main powerhouse, but it had to happen sooner or later. Even if the lad doesn't even know how to hold a pair of binoculars correctly.

Whoever calls the shots in Pyongyang or Beijing, it's also about conveying the message that the dynasty is not dilluted but strengthened: KIM 3 must not be perceived as a mere KIM 2's "mini-me", KIM 2 himself having been sold as a KIM 1 "mini-me". Jong-un is Il-sung reincarnated, and as we saw earlier, the physical resemblance has been cleverly crafted.

Of course, the real news is the fact that RI's fate was decided by the party, a serious challenge to the 'military first' doctrine. The country's few cash machines are expected to be diverted towards different pockets, probably among Pyongyang nomenklatura circles.

That's very risky for the regime, which doesn't control the rest of the country very well. And you don't want to keep the North Korean army angry at you. Let's see if the new Wonsu can survive 2012.


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Sunday, July 15, 2012

Pyongyang's Fairy Tales

North Korean military chief RI Yong-ho has just been officially removed from all official positions. He'd been placed by KIM Jong-il to facilitate the transition of power to KIM Jong-un, but that doesn't mean KIM The Third made the call.

Lately, KIM Jong-un has seemed more focused on entertainment, attending a show featuring Disney characters (without Burbank approval, of course) with a mysterious young lady rumored to be his wife.

RI Yong-ho was supposed to be suffering from illness, but I guess his main problem was to represent the "Juche line". Anyway, his removal seems to strengthen Junior's main chaperone, JANG Sung-taek, whom I strongly suspect of representing the "Beijing Line" (see "Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk").

And Beijing keeps moving its pawns around North Korea. Last week, more roads and railways were announced at the border, fueling speculation of future massive movements of troops.

Again, what I call the "Hanschluss" of Korea by China doesn't require necessarily a military invasion: the Chinese are simply showing basic strategic skills by covering, step by step, all potential entry points at all levels (politic, economic, social, cultural, historical...).
 
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Sunday, December 18, 2011

KIM Jong-il passes. To KIM Jong-un. Presumably.

So as expected, KIM Jong-il died. A bit early to secure the transition with KIM Jong-un, who might be tempted to show his skills to those who doubt he's got whatever that is North Korean leaders are supposed to have.

Physically, Junior already used plastic surgery to improve his Kimilsungist looks, let's hope he won't try to sport his dad's weirdo hairdo now.

Character-wise, Jong-un is rumored to be more ill-tempered than his brothers Jong-nam and Jong-chol, respectively a Disneyland and an Eric Clapton fan. But compared to the Late Dear Leader, he's more permeated with such capitalist perversions as burgers. And it starts showing, particularly in a country where the population is maintained in a constant state of starvation.

As far as leadership is concerned, Jong-un didn't quite pass the cut last year: the young lad has been credited with the latest attack on South Korean soil but doesn't seem much of an expert, judging by the way he uses binoculars...

So we'll follow KIM Jong-il's funerals (after four weddings, Hugh can grant him that*). And eminent Pyeongyangologists will watch closely: who will keep a seat when the music stops? Isn't CHANG Sung-taek a trifle too old for musical chairs? Will Beijing-friendly people get promoted in the army**?

In South Korea, a North Korean Spring or Winter would have consequences for the 2012 elections: more tensions could become a problem for AHN Cheol-soo (commander in chief beyond cyberwars?), and boost conservatives, but not necessarily PARK Geun-hye (would Koreans vote for a woman in times of crisis, and one used to operating only behind the scenes at that?).

By the way. This week-end, LEE Myung-bak visited Japan, and devoted the bulk of his talks with Yoshihiko Noda to the issue of Japanese military sexual slavery, following Wednesday's successful demonstration (see "
One Thousand Wednesdays"). But if he's consistent, the President must also reactivate the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: every country must face its own past, particularly when it expects the same from its neighbors.


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* the movie was released in 1994, the year KIM The First died

**... and the invisible 'hanschluss' continue? see "
Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk", and previous posts about NK

Thursday, May 26, 2011

China imports Hanoks, tames its North Korean "province"

KIM Jong-il interrupted his third visit within one year to China after a clash with PM Wen Jiabao : NK's Dear Leader wanted a comprehensive guarantee from the Central Government for all the frontier projects, but he only got an invitation to negotiate directly with (fellow ?) regional authorities, as well as with private Chinese companies, and only for the Eastern regions. KIM obviously lost face after more or less agreeing (for the zillionth non-binding time) to a denuclearization of the Peninsula and a return to six-party talks. But this drawback doesn't come as a surprise and simply confirms the Hanschluss of "Joseon" by China*. Speaking of China's "Northeast Project", South Korea could be collaborating as well, but unwillingly, and at the cultural level, as it exports its hanok technology to China via a hotel and residence complex of 1,500 houses meant to boost tourism in the region.* Korean minorities represent officially 1% of Heilongjiang's population, but there's a "Jiangnan Korean Ethnic Minority Manzu Xiang" in the Southeastern part of the state, near Ning'all and Ning'anzhen in Mudanjiang area in Ning'an (Ningan) city. Here lied Sanggyeong, a former capital of Balhae, the Korean kingdom that came after Goguryeo in the late 7th century, and covered parts of today's China and Russia. And that's precisely in Ning'an that the complex will be built... I pinpointed the area on Seoul Village map :
View Seoul Village in a larger map I guess we'll probably see more hanoks pop up everywhere across North East China, and the overwhelming majority of Chinese tourists will believe that this is part of their national heritage :
once again, the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences intends to artificially build the historic and cultural center of Koreanity within Chinese borders, and in that regard, the first encounter between Chinese masses and the Korean culture must happen on Chinese soil. Of course, even if I would have preferred KAL's hanok hotel project in Seoul to bloom first (see "Korean Air Grounded : Seoul 7 Star Hotel Delayed"), I'm happy to see a traditional Korean know-how recognized overseas. But this is first about politics, and those enthusiastic South Korean architects are probably not aware of the big picture behind this not so innocent technology transfer. Seoul Village NEW : follow Seoul Village on Facebook and Twitter * see previous episodes, including "Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk" ("China-North Korea : the Great Hanschluss still the base case scenario" on blogules) ** "한옥 수출" ("Hanok exports" - Chosun Ilbo 20110526)

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk

Very interesting conference yesterday at The Plaza Hotel* : "Responding to the Consolidation of Economic Cooperation between North Korea and China" was sponsored by the Korea Finance Corporation (KoFC, the State-run investment arm), and Maeil Business Newspaper (mbn).

For its 18th edition, this North Korea Policy Forum conference became an international seminar, with China, Japan, and the USA providing keynote speakers (bonus: an opening remark - in Korean - by US Ambassador Kathleen STEPHENS, ahead of Hillary CLINTON's visit later this week). Unfortunately, neither Russia (definitely below the radar regarding the issue), nor DPRK (for obvious reasons) were represented.

This Four Party Talk was followed by a captive audience (see exhibit B**), in spite of a very dense agenda (see full program below***) which didn't leave much time for Q&A nor discussions.

What made this conference really exciting were the differences in appreciation of a definitely complex and tricky situation. And at this game, US players spoke their minds out quite freely, even if some Koreans expressed very clearly their concerns to "Mr China" a.k.a. Professor Zhu Feng, absolutely brilliant in his good cop routine : what engagement ? we're not engaged to North Korea, just good neighbors tired of your family affairs - yes, KIM Jong-il is a bad guy and a headache for us as well, but he's your brother, and brothers don't kill each other - yes, these days, our Chinese government is rather conservative, and is pervasively locking key entry points across North Korea, but the colonization of NK by China is a ludicrous conspiration theory - yes, we're doing every day more business here, but as Pr KIM Chul noticed, our entrepreneurs are so much struggling with their local partners that most are curbing their enthusiasm...

Of course, no one mentioned the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences : this was about business, with politics clearly off-limits. As if PRC-DPRK relations were apolitical. As if policies had nothing to do with politics...

Anyway, I had fun and would very much like to attend the next edition - maybe in a different order (first the historical background, then the trends, and finally the various scenarii / recos), and in a different format (e.g. three panelists max for each topic ? a lunch between two power sessions instead of a dinner after a marathon ?).

By then, chances are many more fundamental changes will have happened. If not the end of North Korea, at least a re-engagement by the South, and potentially a summit (consider the past year : Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong-do shelling, KIM Jong-un's promotions, Middle East uprisings, NK reviving its nuke program, Japan spicing North East Asia nuclear nightmares with a new flavor, or the day before the conference a mini-crisis over Mt Gumgang tours...).

If you're familiar with this excuse for a blog, you already know my opinion on North Korea**** :

1) Technically, the North Korean regime is already dead. It only relied on ideology and propaganda, the first lost its substance and the second its efficiency in the eyes of a growing proportion of the population. A little bit like in Iran, ailing and corrupt leaders progressively outsource the power to brutal military forces. At this stage, masses remain overwhelmed and change remains driven by State leaders, but popular rebellions are getting bolder every year, and 450,000 North Koreans have now a mobile phone (reaching far beyond the first nomenklatura circles).

2) The statu quo, or what I called the "Juche line" is not an option - change is coming. For the official end, my base case scenario evolved over time : until the late nineties I believed in an "Albania scenario" (brutal collapse, masses fleeing the country, cult of personality victims abused by con people and more or less religious cults...), but spectacular initiatives from China followed by the highly controversial Northeast Project led me to believe in the more subtle, progressive, and pervasive "Hanschluss scenario". A scenario confirmed by the ambitious developments announced over the following 2-3 years for North East China (on schedule, as we saw yesterday during the conference) : once again, whatever the motives and whatever North Korean leaders do, they also result in artificially relocating the epicenter of Koreanity on Chinese soil, and more physically than intense revisionism about Korean history (ie Goguryo). A scenario sealed by LEE Myung-bak in 2007 : South Korea's disengagement precipitated further the North towards China, leaving no dovish alternative.

3) Of course, China doesn't need to politically integrate North Korea as another province : an unofficial vassal status easy does it, and the process seems very well engaged. Reminder : the Cheonan aggression was about internal affairs, but not between both Koreas. KIM Jong-il had first to reassess his friendship with the army, and second to get some leverage ahead of the "negociations" with the PRC. Chaperoned by CHANG Sung-taek, KIM Jong-un got the nod from Beijing : KJI's brother in law later developped a parallel FDI tool, more China-friendly than the official one. He also lost a rival in a convenient car accident... No need to read fortune cookies to understand that more high ranking officials will join the collaborators to push their luck. With the Yeonpyeong island shelling, Junior assessed his own friendship with the army (nevermind those darn binoculars). Father and son completed the pledge of allegiance with a familial pilgrimage in China, where Grand Dad KIM Il-sung himself got his education, an other way of accepting the only filiation that counts : NK's Motherland is China.

4) The Great Hanschluss is not completed yet. Both China and South Korea are also experiencing ideology crisis at home between conservatism, progressivism, and agnostic pragmatism / reform. South Korea and North Korea share more common ground than survivors of a lost era. They still share an identity and a destiny. And this is not about rejecting China, but about embracing themselves.

Seoul Village 2011

* now it's simply "The Plaza", to mark the difference with the Seoul Plaza in front. That was my first visit there since the renovation (see "
Seoul Plaza Hotel joins the renovation frenzy"). If the outer shell didn't change spectacularly, the inside looks much classier: an Italian designer added a European boutique hotel flavor.

** including yours truly (exhibit B: Paris, Texas alias Stephane and Steven - photo by KIM Jae-hun, Maeil Business Newspaper - "
北·中 교류, 일방적 원조서 시장원리로 전환") :

*** Full program:
- Opening remarks : RYU Jae-han (President, KoFC), CHANG Dae-hwan (CEO, Maeil Business Newspaper), Kathleen STEPHENS (US Ambassador to South Korea)
- Panel One ("East Asian Regional Cooperation and North Korea-China Relations" and "China's Approach to North Korea: National Interests and Strategy") :
. moderator : HONG Yang-ho (former Vice-Minister of Unification)
. presenters : Matsuno SHUJI (Ritsumeikan University), John Delury (Yonsei University), Zhu Feng (Beijing University)
. panelists : LEE Chan-woo (Tokyo International University - NB: the first to entertain the audience with maps), Edward REED (from The Asia Foundation - NB : only had time to phrase the key questions, but it was worth the trip), LEE Hui-ok (Sungkyunkwan University), KIM Heung-kyu (Sungshin Women's University), KIM Yong-hyun (Dongguk University)
- Panel Two ("The Present and Future of Economic Cooperation Between North Korea and China" and "China's Growing Influence on North Korea and How South Korea Should Respond") :
. moderator : LEE Sang-man (Chairman, the Steering Committee for the North Korea Policy Forum)
. presenters : YOON Seung-hyun (Yanbian University, NEA Research Institute), Scott SNYDER (Center for US-Korea Policy), PARK Gun-il (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
. panelists : OH Seung-ryul (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies - NB: the first to mention the obvious limits of official statistics, which capture only part of exchanges between DPRK and PRC), KIM Chul (Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences), CHEONG Seong-chang (Sejong Institute), CHU Suk-yong (KoFC - Ministry of Unification), KIM Se-hyung (Chief Editor, Maeil Business Newspaper)
**** see previous posts on NK, and in particular the focus on the "Great Hanschluss" ("Great Wall of China - Anschlussing Korea (continued)" - also on blogules in English "a greater wall of china - bonus, korea inside (the great hanschluss)" and in French "La Grande Muraille de Chine à l'assaut de la Corée (l'ultime Hanschluss)")

Thursday, February 10, 2011

NK 4.0 ? KIM Jon-il's latest son is only 7

An ailing dictatorship, a corrupt regime artificially maintained by a military mafia, no respect of human rights whatsoever, and now a seventh kid from a fourth wife (Kim OK)*... KIM Jong-il seems to be competing with old style Arab dictators.

But North Korea is neither a Middle Eastern nation, nor even Tunisia or Egypt. And if the internet ban technically prevents a 2.0 revolution in Korea, any uprising would probably trigger a more direct intervention by China. Maybe not as radical as the 2009 repression in Iran, but pervasive containment would remain the general concept.

Seoul Village 2011

* "
Kim Jong-il 'Has 7-Year-Old Son'" (Chosun Ilbo)

Friday, August 27, 2010

N.K. 3.0 rebooted - and relocated

Kim Jong-il allegedly brought his son and designated successor Kim Jong-un to his own father's school in China (Kim Il-sung attended the Yuwen Middle School in Changchun, Jilin).

This "pilgrimage" is of course meant to restate the dynasty*, but also to appease Beijing : it looks as if the KIM Trilogy found its very legitimacy in "the motherland"... in other words, yet another confirmation that the North Korean regime are selling their own country to their big neighbors in exchange for their survival**.

OK. Maybe the People's Liberation Army hasn't come back to Pyeongyang yet. But it's already venturing into other neighboring countries. Last stop ? Pakistanese Kashmir***.

Seoul Village 2010

* see today's S.K. press, ie "Kim Jong-il pilgrimages in China’s Changchun" (JoongAng Daily)
** see previous episodes, including "
after the Cheonan tragedy, the Juche, Sunshine, or China Line ?", "Kim Jong-il's bridge to nowhere"...
*** "
China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands"

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

After the Cheonan Tragedy : the Juche, Sunshine, or China Line ?

I've been often asked what I thought about the sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean navy ship, presumably by a North Korean torpedo.

The Cheonan tragedy logically raised the issue of succession wars around the ailing KIM Jong-il, who himself played similar nasty tricks to secure his daddy's job (back then, a commercial plane destroyed).

Actually, I mostly consider it as collateral damage from internal tensions within North Korea, between the usual 3 main local lobbies, and particularly the first two :
- what I call the "Juche Line" : die-hard partisans of independence from China, Russia, and of course Western powers starting with the "puppet regimes" down South. From KIM Il-sung to KIM Jong-il, the path has narrowed to a dead end and the position is absolutely not sustainable. The "strategy" or lack of can be summed up as "tricks and treats" : show me the money / dough / rice or else...
- the "China Line" : collaborators for whom the only sustainable way for NK regime is to sell the country to China, play their infamous Northeastern Project, accept their Hanschluss (see for instance "
Great Wall of China - Anschlussing Korea (continued)")
- the (shrinking) "Sunshine Line" : "doves" (or the closest breed you can find that side of the DMZ) for whom the best case scenario would be a reunification with the South in the long term, with small and careful steps on the way, and a progressive evolution of NK politics, economics, and society.

Over the past few years, the change has been spectacular : the LEE Myung-bak government put an end to the Sunshine Policy, putting Jucheists off balance, but precipitating North Korea altogether into the arms of Beijing.

The Cheonan incident confirmed the trend, with very significant changes :
- new tone in Beijing, new vocabulary : a cold reception for KIM Jong-il, and a way of presenting North Korean issues as internal affairs. De facto, North Korea is now considered as a part of China, its rulers must report to Beijing, Beijing is legitimate for everything regarding national politics and security.
- tighter economic ties have been knotted between Beijing and Pyeongyang to compensate for the ones severed with the South.
- the trip of CHANG Sung-taek and KIM Jong-un one year ago in China was obviously very profitable for Beijing : KIM Jong-il's brother in law and son apparently joined the "China Line", isolating more than ever the ailing dictator. CHANG lost a rival in a convenient car accident and created an alternate FDI agency visibly very pro-China, and the now official heir apparent seems to be willing to play the role the big neighbor expected him to play : a DENG Xiaoping-like reformer moving the country (sorry : "the region") closer to "motherland" China.

Meanwhile, in the South, ultra-conservatives fuel mutual hatred on which they thrive, misusing the 60th anniversary of the war and the 100th anniversary of the Japanese rule to actually undermine the nation and help their counterparts in China and Japan. Uncle Sam ? The US want "no drama" in the area, and some would almost be glad to leave it up to China instead of risking more commercial skirmishes. The US-SK joint navy operations, initially planned in the Yellow Sea, have been diplomatically moved to the other side of the peninsula. Gates and Clinton are to visit the DMZ today.

Sadly, the Cheonan tragedy is about North Korean internal politics or, as seen from China, Chinese internal politics.

I don't think now is the time to reactivate the Sunshine Policy as it was, but severing the few positive links was definitely an ideal gift to China.

Seoul Village 2010