China reaches high speed into North Korea... and post-Juche East Asia

KBS detailed yesterday* a high speed line to be built by China across North Korea. It would follow the Pyongui Line (Pyongyang-Dandong), and furthermore the Gyeongui Line that connected Seoul with Pyongyang.

According to KBS, the DPRK Economic Development Commission confirmed in February a December 2013 agreement that would change the whole region, even if in the short to medium term only a minority were to use the infrastructure.

If the line falls short of reaching into China and the DMZ by stopping at Sinuiju and Kaesong, it gives a clear advantage for China and its technology in post-Juche Korea. South Korea will have little choice but to connect - or to try the alternate Rason route with Russia.

Construction would last 6 years, with two waves that have not been fully detailed yet:

• 1st stretches: 80 km
• From the North: Sinuiju Station - Tongrim Station (Sinuiju-Dongnim, 40 km)
• From the South: Kaesong - Yonan (Gaesong-Yeonan, 40 km)
• 2nd stretches: 296 km
• From the North: Tongrim - Chongju - Sinanju - Pyongyang (Dongnim-Jeongju-Sinanju-Pyongyang, 147 km)
• From the South: Yonan - Haeju - Sariwon - Pyongyang (Yeonan-Haeju-Sariwon-Pyongyang, 149 km)

It also mean that Chinese executives and engineers will roam the country for a long while, including at the doorsteps of Kaesong Industrial Complex. China will operate for 30 years on a BOT basis (Build Operate Transfer), likely into post-Juche DPRK. 

Note that this agreement happened around the JANG Sung-taek purge, and that over the past few months, China also gained long term concessions to use North Korean land.

The silent "Hanschluss"* seems well under way. And this Northeast Project of a railway doesn't even need to rewrite history: it's the economy, stupid.

Seoul Village 2014
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*  "개성~신의주 고속철 북중 계약 체결" (KBS News 20140407) - NB: thanks Nikola "Kojects" Medimorec for the link!
** see "Game over for the 'Hanschluss' scenario?", "Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk"(on blogules: "China-North Korea : the Great Hanschluss still the base case scenario")... 

20140409 addendum (remarks and reminders):
. This KBS story has not yet been confirmed by any other media, and a MOU is by no means the final deal. We learn how long the construction would take (6 years), but not when it would start, if it does. What matters here is the nature of the concessions made by the DPRK as they (re)negociate with China.
. Note that the Shenyang-Dandong high speed section will be inaugurated in 2015 ("China to open high speed rail link to North Korean border in 2015"). Dandong and Sinuiju are separated by the Yalu River, but I don't know if, among the many new bridges planned by China between both nations, some are already planned as rail-friendly. Shenyang shall also be connected with Beijing, Harbin, and Dalian.  

On The Korea Project, Northtalgia, and the DaimlerChrysler Syndrom

Picture yourself in Korea, about 20-25 years after the reunification, and try to imagine what it means, what it takes to get it right.

And please, get John Lennon out of your head: don't "picture yourself in a boat, on a river, with tangerine trees and marmalade skies", and don't "imagine all the people, living for today... imagine there's no countries". Try to be as realistic as possible.

Now in order to be realistic, you not only need to study scenarii for Korea, but for the whole region as well. Even China (especially China?) won't be the same player as the one we're used to today. And how will the much needed* regional truth and reconciliation process have evolved (if it ever begins)? Start with international relations and you're sure to end up with "kaleidoscope eyes"...

Hopefully, IR only came in the third and final phase of The Korean Project. This program led by David C. KANG (Director, USC Korean Studies Institute) and Victor CHA (Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies Korea)** tackles the strategic challenges towards Korean reunification and beyond, and the first two phases focused on functional aspects (eg education, transitional justice, nation building, health, agriculture, environment, military, law and order...), pooling experts on each issue with experts on North Korea, leveraging experiences from all over the world.

Today, Phase III*** confirmed the difficulties added by international relation challenges to an already utterly daunting and complex task. And each contributor could only give his best shot at what would be the reactions from his own country, reflecting only a fraction of a wide array of mindsets. But precisely, the voices of the moderates could be heard, and the probably utopic compartmentalization (a debate not polluted by pseudo-nationalistic interferences) could happen.

Of course, not all issues could be raised in one day (and I plead guilty for phagocytizing, with my silly remarks, an indecent part of the time devoted to Q and As), but the event hosted by The ASAN Institute was a success, and not only because US Ambassador to Korea Sung KIM said hi, or because there were moments of "Détente" in spite of the tense international context:

"Détente" time at the Asan Institute: The Korea Project Part III with David C. KANG, PAN Zhenqiang, Victor CHA, CHUNG Jae-ho, Evan RAMSTAD (photo © Stephane MOT) 

Chinese opinions on Korean reunification are not that common, and the voice of PAN Zhenqiang, a Retired Major General of the People's Liberation Army, counts a lot. Yes, there were more references to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zeming than to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Yes, we're still tempted to read between the lines, but all players can be suspected of having their own interpretations, and today, there were more questions about nuances and vocabulary than there are shades of grey: what's your "threshold" to intervene? what does "moving first" mean? what do you mean by "move"? what could trigger/justify/legitimize a movement? what's your definition of involvement/interference/intervention? how do you distinguish "regime collapse" and "state collapse"? what does threatening China's "core interests" mean? "Do you love your mother"? (thank WOO Jung-yeop for that moment of Détente - no reference to any motherland, mind you)

So China feels Korea's pain, "being a divided nation itself". General PAN clearly referred to Taiwan (by the way: "China's formula of "one country, two systems" may have some exemplary value"), but didn't go into the details regarding what Reunited China would cover ultimately. Anyway, China wants "an independent and peaceful unification" for Korea. "Independence" to a certain point: the UN Security Council has a role to play (along with China and its veto rights). And "Peaceful" means not only an absence of conflict but also a clear consensus between both Koreas (the North Korean regime being of course totally independent from Beijing). "Unification" means that Korea was never united before, and thus never an independent entity. And oh: "China is the great stakeholder in the peninsula".

Since General PAN declared that the government followed the mainstream, "serious research community", and didn't condone the more exotic ones, I raised the Northeast Project issue: I'm glad to hear that, but I wish we could hear the mainstream, "serious research community" out loud, if not denouncing the impostures, at least standing for serious records. No answer to that question, but to the question "how mainstream is the view, within China, that Korea shouldn't get reunited if you consider how Vietnam turned its back to China", he answered: "we have a lot of amateur strategic analysts, not to be taken seriously". And as you, Dear Reader, well know, the same could be said about this excuse of a writer, who defines his blogs as "Weapons of Mass Disinformation".

SOEYA Yoshihide spoke very frankly about where Japan stands, the cost of unsolved regional feuds, and the gap between how much Japan could help and what it will probably be allowed to do (beyond serving as an ATM and financial supporter, that is). I renewed my wish that Japan seized the opportunity and led the much needed truth and reconciliation effort across the continent: instead of being cast to the periphery of a region geopolitically redrawn following the reunification, Japan could become the undisputed leader in diplomacy and strengthten its positions at all levels (political, economic, social). The shortest and surest way to become the solution is to stop being the problem but of course, that's not on top of Shinzo Abe's agenda, not his idea of "moving first" or "acting as a leader".

I've already said that Russia is, among the 6 parties, the player who objectively has the best cards to play nowadays. Everybody agrees on the need to improve key bilateral mutual understandings to pave the way for as smooth a transition as possible: South-North, USA-China, Japan-Korea, and that leaves Russia with the opportunity to be the key facilitator, the only (potentially) true win-win-win-win-win-win player. Russia knows well that the political and meteorological climate change can totally boost the Eastern half of its own nation, and that common sense will lead reunited Korea to manage risk by balancing its strategic entry points to the continent between China and Russia.

Unsurprisingly, Alexander VORONTSOV highlighted the importance of railways and pipelines, or the potential of Rason container terminal. But he's also very much concerned about military questions, and insisted on the importance of a potential border issue between Russia and reunited Korea, stating that it would definitely help if South Korea recognized the borders as agreed between Russia and the DPRK well ahead of the reunification.

One should hope Seoul already studied the fine prints in all the treaties between the DPRK and other nations. But one must take into account the fact that the Republic of Korea recognises itself as the only legitimate government in its constitution, that not everybody recognises the DPRK as a nation.

Victor CHA insisted on having everybody's vision about legitimacy and alignment for good reasons. The ROK is very much aware of the precautions needed, but never questions its own legitimacy to lead the reunification effort. The "UN" scenario described by SNU's YOON Young-kwan could be messy indeed. According to him, conservatives would rather follow the German model, and progressives the "Hong Kong SAR" model (step by step, containment to prevent mass migrations). But as WOO Jung-yeop put it: "will we have the luxury to chose a model?", and "we don't know what we want". South Korea cannot lead a reunification effort tomorrow if it can't even reach a consensus on key principles today.

I don't feel comfortable with the way the reunification is presented as the simple integration of the North to the South economy or democracy. As if it were an acquisition and not a merger. We all know this won't be a merger of equals at the demographic or economic level (let's cut the DaimlerChrysler hypocrisy), but the people and the regions of the North must be respected and involved in the process as stakeholders as important as the people and the regions of the South. Besides, 60 years of history should not be obliterated, and just like Ostalgia bloomed in Eastern Germany, some positive form of "Northtalgia" may become a cultural asset (beyond dark tourism).

Furthermore, you can't put the failure of the North Korean regime on the people of North Korea. South Korea and the international community also failed to achieve reunification so far. David KANG accurately repeats that South Koreans should never come with a "we won, you lose - we're smart, you're dumb" mindset, and I think the time has come to say "we both made mistakes, we may not agree today, but we must work to make sure that in the end, Korea wins as a whole".

Which role for the North Korean diaspora, beyond the defectors to South Korea? The Chosen-seki / Chongryon / Mindan game in Japan looks much less complex than the case of China, particularly following massive mixed marriages along the Yalu river. Nationality issues will be very tricky, and in my worst "Hanschluss" scenario, Beijing could leverage porous borders to impact self-determination ballots in the medium to long term. If international coopetition were not enough, don't underestimate inter-regional tensions: North Korean regions are not less valuable than South Korean regions, and everybody should rejoice to see this rich cultural heritage reunited, but I wouldn't be surprised if Jeollanam-do started complaining about Ryanggang-do getting all the subsidies. And Korea being Korea, I'd recommend a moratorium for all real estate issues, and a protection from the Chaebollization of the North.

There should be no confusion: this is a reunification, not a unification, not the creation of a nation that never existed before. And reunited Korea should be a model republic and democracy. But I raised the importance of how the country will define itself and particularly how it will be named.

Korea, of course. But that's in English. And it's not like Germany, who could keep the "Deutschland" denominator (BRD/DDR). The North uses "Joseon", the South "Hanguk", both "uri nara". Anyway, "Dae Han Min Guk" seems the obvious official name for the republic, and the flag should remain the Taegeukgi, but both the name and the symbol should refer to the whole nation and to the roots of democracy and independence during the occupation, certainly not to the victory of the South over the North.

I'm looking forward to the final products of The Korean Project, and I hope it won't stop there. Reunification has already started, it's a major project and an ongoing process, and beyond the report, the public as well as the authorities will need to visualize threads. We passed the stage where saying "we're working on reunification, we're investing money in it" is enough, and we must move to the stage where everybody can follow the process and say: wait a minute, this specific issue doesn't seem to be advancing, we need answers and outputs. And to have someone to blame or to praise, even if it's just the usual six suspects.


Seoul Village 2013
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UPDATE 20130123: North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to nukes later in the day...
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* see "We reject as false the choice between revisionism and nationalism - for a Global Truth and Reconciliation Network"
** special mention to The Korea Foundation, key sponsor of a project very consistent with its mission
*** The Korea Project Part III
Tuesday, January 22, 2013 at the Asan Institute of Policy Studies
Opening remarks: David C. KANG (Director, USC Korean Studies Institute), Victor CHA (Chair, CSIS Korea), HAHM Chaibong (President, The Asan Institute of Policy Studies)
Session I: Reactions from Japan and Russia (moderated by D. KANG)
- Paper authors: SOEYA Yoshihide (Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University), Alexander VORONTSOV (Head, Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies and Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences)
- Discussants: Leif-Eric EASLEY (Ehwa University, The Asan Institute), Robert KELLY (Pusan National University), LEE Hawon (Chosun Ilbo)
Session II: Reactions from China (moderated by V. CHA)
- Paper authors: PAN Zhenqiang (Senior Advisor, China Reform Forum and China Foundation for International Studies, Director, Research Institute for Strategy and Management), ZHU Feng (Deputy Director, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University - NB: not present today)
- Discussants: CHUNG Jae-ho (Seoul National University), Evan RAMSTAD (Wall Street Journal)
Session III: Reactions from South Korea (moderated by D. KANG)
- Paper authors: CHOO Jaewoo (Professor, Chinese Foreign Policy, Kyung Hee University), YOON Young-kwan (Department of International Relations, Seoul National University)
- Discussants: Bryan PORT (Deputy Director of Strategy, UN Command-Combined Forces Command-US Forces Korea), WOO Jung-yeop (The Asan Institute)
Roundtable on future steps (V. CHA and D. KANG)

Gwanghwamun inauguration

I decently couldn't miss the inauguration of Gwanghwamun after all those years of waiting and following every step of the restoration. Furthermore, the weather made the short walk almost pleasant. Last night, a massive thunderstorm raged over our heads, relentlessly pouring buckets everywhere like an unruly army of Fantasia brooms, and today, a bright ray of sun even illuminated Sejongno right after the balloons lifted the banner hiding the gate's nameplate.

4,000 guests and thousands of Seoul citizens attended the show, waiting for a long limousine to arrive from Hyojaro and drop LEE Myung-bak in a pale yellow hanbok. The President reached his place like a Jeoson rock star, accompanied with classical music, and making everyone wonder what the show was all about : the 65th anniversary of Independence, Gwanghwamun inauguration, or a political meeting* ?

Quite an atmosphere, indeed : the colors, music and balloons were sometimes more reminiscent of a Fourth of July in Armpit, Tennessee, or a Bastille Day in a small village in rural Cantal. The National Anthem, sung four times by pro singers, Independence veterans, young kids, and all together, kind of put the focus back on the event.

The nameplate was quickly and successfully unveiled, so that the Presidential speech could start. Nice words about "fair society" (a few days after a massive Presidential Pardon for top politicians and businessmen) and reunification (mostly to introduce a new "reunification tax").

100 years after the official beginning of the Japanese occupation**, LEE also saluted the formal apologies from Naoto Kan : for the first time, a Japanese Government recognized the fact that the annexation was "against the will of the Korean people".

And for the first time, the other day, Japanese extreme-right die harders made a big mistake by inviting Jean-Marie Le Pen and other controversial European figures at Yasukuni : they wanted to react to Kan's refusal to visit this controversial shrine, but doing so, they also exposed their true nature and imposture to their own fellow citizens. Maybe, this time, the Japanese people will start to contest this troubled minority the right to decide who can remain a Prime Minister, and the right to decide what must be written in history textbooks.

Seoul Village 2010

* of course, Independence and Gwanghwamun are also about politics.
** as we all know, it started earlier in Dokdo.

After the Cheonan Tragedy : the Juche, Sunshine, or China Line ?

I've been often asked what I thought about the sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean navy ship, presumably by a North Korean torpedo.

The Cheonan tragedy logically raised the issue of succession wars around the ailing KIM Jong-il, who himself played similar nasty tricks to secure his daddy's job (back then, a commercial plane destroyed).

Actually, I mostly consider it as collateral damage from internal tensions within North Korea, between the usual 3 main local lobbies, and particularly the first two :
- what I call the "Juche Line" : die-hard partisans of independence from China, Russia, and of course Western powers starting with the "puppet regimes" down South. From KIM Il-sung to KIM Jong-il, the path has narrowed to a dead end and the position is absolutely not sustainable. The "strategy" or lack of can be summed up as "tricks and treats" : show me the money / dough / rice or else...
- the "China Line" : collaborators for whom the only sustainable way for NK regime is to sell the country to China, play their infamous Northeastern Project, accept their Hanschluss (see for instance "Great Wall of China - Anschlussing Korea (continued)")
- the (shrinking) "Sunshine Line" : "doves" (or the closest breed you can find that side of the DMZ) for whom the best case scenario would be a reunification with the South in the long term, with small and careful steps on the way, and a progressive evolution of NK politics, economics, and society.

Over the past few years, the change has been spectacular : the LEE Myung-bak government put an end to the Sunshine Policy, putting Jucheists off balance, but precipitating North Korea altogether into the arms of Beijing.

The Cheonan incident confirmed the trend, with very significant changes :
- new tone in Beijing, new vocabulary : a cold reception for KIM Jong-il, and a way of presenting North Korean issues as internal affairs. De facto, North Korea is now considered as a part of China, its rulers must report to Beijing, Beijing is legitimate for everything regarding national politics and security.
- tighter economic ties have been knotted between Beijing and Pyeongyang to compensate for the ones severed with the South.
- the trip of CHANG Sung-taek and KIM Jong-un one year ago in China was obviously very profitable for Beijing : KIM Jong-il's brother in law and son apparently joined the "China Line", isolating more than ever the ailing dictator. CHANG lost a rival in a convenient car accident and created an alternate FDI agency visibly very pro-China, and the now official heir apparent seems to be willing to play the role the big neighbor expected him to play : a DENG Xiaoping-like reformer moving the country (sorry : "the region") closer to "motherland" China.

Meanwhile, in the South, ultra-conservatives fuel mutual hatred on which they thrive, misusing the 60th anniversary of the war and the 100th anniversary of the Japanese rule to actually undermine the nation and help their counterparts in China and Japan. Uncle Sam ? The US want "no drama" in the area, and some would almost be glad to leave it up to China instead of risking more commercial skirmishes. The US-SK joint navy operations, initially planned in the Yellow Sea, have been diplomatically moved to the other side of the peninsula. Gates and Clinton are to visit the DMZ today.

Sadly, the Cheonan tragedy is about North Korean internal politics or, as seen from China, Chinese internal politics.

I don't think now is the time to reactivate the Sunshine Policy as it was, but severing the few positive links was definitely an ideal gift to China.

Seoul Village 2010

banNK accounts and other accounts for historians

People from North Korea will be allowed to open bank accounts in China and do business in Yuan.

You know what kind of people from North Korea can afford this kind of tasks these days.

Pyeongyang's regime is offered a safe heaven in return for what ? Probably a Chinese anschluss of Chosun, as a province of the new and improved Koguryo, the fake cultural and historical center of Korea under construction in North East China, with the benediction of an army of revisionist historians.

Under the Middle Kingdom's powerful umbrella, this new Tibet will then demand the reunification with that renegate and remote piece of land called South Korea.

Pathetic.

Don't get me wrong. I love China and respect its unique civilisation. I do know its cultural influence on the region in general and especially in Korea.

But Korea is not a Chinese province and Koguryo doesn't belong to China.

And Beijing's top strategists are playing a very dangerous game by fueling ultranationalism. This folly is the best way to keep a nation united in the short term and to make it implode in the medium term. Remember Yugoslavia. See how xenophobia and antisemitism are condemning Putin's Russia.

China is a great country and the birthplace of strategy, but I'm afraid Sun Tzu's heirs are losing their minds and waging the wrong battles at the wrong moment.