The Ambiguous Kim Young-sam Legacy

Kim Young-sam (1927-2015)

I'm curious to see how Korea will remember KIM Young-sam, a man who always wanted to leave his mark on History, but could end up as a more controversial, transitional figure. Anyway, a very interesting character in Korean politics.

A democracy fighter turned political weather vane, an enemy of PARK Chung-hee and CHUN Doo-hwan turned nemesis of KIM Dae-jung, a bold reformer of the financial sector turned victim of the IMF crisis, KIM Young-sam almost seems to have both reached and left Cheong Wa Dae like a thief. 

By running against DJ, YS helped ROH Tae-woo make history: return to democracy, establishing relationships with Russia and China... An historic meeting with KIM Il-sung would have secured his own legacy, but the North Korean leader died on him.

Like Saemangeum, his dream project (see "Ari, Arirang, Ari, Ariul City"), KIM Young-sam's legacy is a gigantic oddity still in the making, and like himself, a consuming ambition still looking for a purpose, a place in History.

Now let's see how PARK Geun-hye presents this predecessor of hers, particularly his 'democracy fighter' side. The opposition will also have a tough job, but somehow KIM Young-sam is a mirror exposing all the beauties and flaws of this nation's complex psyche.

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KIM Han-sol - Episode IV, Striking Back At The Empire?

KIM Han-sol will study political sciences in Sciences Po Le Havre  (see "Un petit-fils de Kim Jong-il à Sciences po" (20130827 - L'Express).

The first time KIM Jong-nam's son (KIM Jong-un's nephew, KIM Jong-il's grandson, KIM Il-sung's great-grandson - NB: nothing to do with KIM Yu-na) made the world headlines was when he distanced himself from the North Korean dictatorship as Elisabeth REHN interviewed him for Yle, Finland's public broadcasting company (see videos below):







The teenager was then studying at the Mostar campus of United World College because Hong-Kong authorities didn't grant him a student visa, and BIH was a friendlier destination. Han-sol had less trouble living in another SAR, Macau, where his dad majored in Gambling magna cum laude, with an exchange student experience at Tokyo Disneyland University, and a Master's Degree in Fashion Disasters.

KIM Han-sol will not study at the main Sciences Po, the prestigious IEP Paris, Rue Saint-Guillaume. But Le Havre campus does makes sense: that's the one devoted to Europe-Asia, all courses are delivered in English, and there's even a Korean language program.

The main news, of course, is that a fourth generation KIM is venturing into politics, and for the first time, with notions of actual democracy reaching beyond the experience of life in a Western democracy.

And if you don't like KIM Han-sol's ear piercing, that's another positive leap forward from the previous generation:

KIM Jong-nam majored in Gambling magna cum laude at Macau International School of Jokers, was an exchange student experience at Tokyo Disneyland University, and got a Master's Degree in Fashion Disasters

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Beyond Containment: Andrei Lankov On Stage (10 Magazine Book Club)

Over the past few months, Andrei Nikolaevich LANKOV has been everywhere, on every network. The Russian expert of North Korea even had to join Twitter under media pressure (yes, the voluble LANKOV restricted to 140 characters, that's possible, and that's on @AndreiLankov).

Granted, for the release of his latest book, "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia"*, he did receive the hell of a boost from KIM Jong-un, but LANKOV doesn't need anybody's help to become a media darling: this man doesn't even use kid gloves to handle the most fissile materials, and nuclear countdowns have never been that fun watching ever since Peter Sellers brought the house down in Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove".

Yesterday, the showman was on stage in Myeong-dong for Barry Welsh's 10 Magazine Book Club, and he tirelessly explored every square inch of it with mickjaggeresque energy - barely pausing for a sip of tea now and then to fuel his own reactor.

Does Andrei Lankov rock & roll? You bet!
twitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/358831263123111936

A pundit of the "pound it" variety, LANKOV can not only dance like a butterfly and sting like a bee, but also crack the audience up with outrageous wit ("Human Rights did improve under KIM Jong-un: from unbelievingly bad to exceptionally bad" / "Most defectors from North Korea are 40-50 year-old ajumma - in the Soviet Union, it used to be young and smart Jewish chess players").

Kim Il-sung trying to stop Andrei Lankov, in vain. Great show at @10MagBookClub todaytwitter.com/theseoulvillage/status/358883923025092608

Impossible to sum up a show that covered a remarquable scope considering the limited time (one hour presentation, one hour Q and A). Just a few insights:

• It was easier to reduce the military's economic influence than to tame private entrepreneurship. The rising class of private entrepreneurs is seen as a threat by the party nomenklatura, less apt to survive in case of change. At this stage, neither sees their shared interest. LANKOV doesn't believe in a coup. The only underground he sees is the not very impressive Christian one. (NB: beyond the scenario of an organized coup, many things can happen, from an individual going rogue to KJU choking tomorrow on a pretzel.)
• (About what I called the "Hanschluss scenario") LANKOV does consider the scenario of a puppet regime controled by Beijing, but only a "open" one that would happen after the collapse of the regime and a military intervention of China. Needless to say, that would not be well perceived by North Koreans, who would then blame Beijing for anything going wrong.
• North Korea remains very rational. LANKOV doesn't think KJU marked a disruption (NB: I agree in substance but not in style - if he does keep both the "Juche Line" and "Beijing Line" parties sweet following his dad's guidelines, he ruined everything with his lack of patience, alienating key supporters in China**)
• The very existence of a successful South Korea can become a hindrance for evolution. A country like China could carry out significant reforms, but "where is South China?" (NB: AL logically considers Taiwan's impact as limited at the economic level, the difference in wealth being 3 times compared to up to 40 between both Koreas - furthermore Taiwan is relatively tiny. A question from the audience stressed the political importance of even tiny Taiwan as a democratic model)
• Internet: LANKOV wouldn't be surprised to see the world wide web partially accessible in a near future. The risks are obvious, but control technologies have considerably improved, and the risk of lagging too far behind is even greater.
• Reunification: many North Koreans see it through rose-colored glasses, thinking South Koreans are eagerly looking forward to it, and that economic problems would be solved within a couple of years.
• ...

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* "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia"
Oxford University Press - April 2013
** "This Time Is Different - Six Decades of North Korean Follies (The Umpteenth Final Countdown)"
*** "Game over for the 'Hanschluss' scenario?"

This Time Is Different - Six Decades of North Korean Follies (The Umpteenth Final Countdown)

Nuclear threats, cyberattacks, rumors of coups and collapse up North, the end is nigher than ever, repent, and don't forget to update your V3 antivirus before their V2 rockets rain down... We've seen that drama before, particularly in KOR/US military drill season.

Yet at the same time, and to anti-paraphrase the Reinhart-Rogoff post-Lehman bestseller "This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly", we're as always tempted to think "this time, that's it", the gimchi will really hit the fan, the North Korean regime is done.

Now China joining the US and South Korea in a united front, that could be a game changer.


1) KIM Jong-un has achieved little more than using up the arsenal of war premilinaries....:

There's not much he can do to top himself, except pushing the red button:

• Rethoric-wise, KIM The Third has already reached Armageddon territories: the ceasefire is already over (almost), the Red Telephone is already cut (but still working), and America is already going up in flames (on YouTube videos). Now KIM The Third seems prisoner of his own PR, supported by a zimbabwean inflation in provocations and an almost constant red alert mode even his daddy didn't need. And it took KIM The Second four years to claim all key powers, he a much more trained and legitimate heir who'd been around long before the founder of the dynasty passed away.
• Military-wise, Jong-un has already bombed South Korean land (see "We need to talk about KIM"). To top that, he needs either a bigger target, or bigger bombs...
• Nuclear-wise, Junior went beyond dad's "Jucheterrence" by betting all on the missile and nuclear programs. He announced more trials but basically, the message has already been transmitted. And if he doesn't show spectacular improvements next time, local supporters might cool down. Considering the country's limited resources, "if the North Korean regime doesn't renounce the program, North Korean elites will eventually renounce the regime - unless one of the regime's last friends steps in and does it all by itself" (see "Hell is other Democratic People's Republic of Korea").
• Cyberwar-wise, there's still room for manoeuvre. Whoever carried out last week's attacks*, they delivered a clear warning about how far they could reach: we can disrupt your media and finance sectors, we used your security system to do that, and we even left a message to let you know that it was just a small IED left by the weakest elements of our infantry, nothing compared to the waves that will follow (the "Hastati" reference). It works and it's cheap, but unless a full-fledged cyber attack is lauched, that truly cripples the South ahead of a real offensive, these operations will appear like recurrent drills to train response teams.



A Nukie Monster for Baby Kim?

• More conventional asymetric warfare? Abductions, sabotage, terror, guerilla? Not very expensive either, but been there, done that. And North Korea would somehow lose its standing as a rogue nuclear nation. Furthermore, maintaining sleeping cells below radar surface isn't that easy with fake defectors actually defecting to the South (or to China).

2) ... and alienating his last allies:

The regim seems weaker than ever at home:

• Compared to North Korea's doomsday arsenal, the international community's rudimentary weapons seem to have significantly hurt the regime. Pyongyang has more trouble funnelling illegal funds into the country, and the nasty business model of North Korea Inc, or rather North Korea Offshore Unlimited, has been fully exposed in South Korean media, including the way "diplomats" spend their time traveling or visiting casinos to get rid of counterfeit money by small bundles**. 
• That money is paramount for a regime that needs to corrupt at home as well, to keep full support from the military and a nomenclatura... and they have learned how to develop their own illegal sources of income. Recurrent purges or calls for denounciations cannot solve everything now that almost two million individuals have a cellphone. Even foreigners can use one now.
• Like his dad, KIM Jong-un is rumored to have survived at least one assassination attempt. If repression and fear remains, full containment and trust belong to the past.

And NK's top sponsor Beijing is moving closer to the rest of the international community:

• China does continues to provide food and energy, to allow transfers from friendly banks, and to send defectors back to the North (particularly when they're soldiers, like recently), but it supported significant UN sanctions, along with Russia***.
• China also started to control closely North Korean restaurants in the country. This may seem trivial, but restaurants are a key entry point for illegal workers and imports, and a steady source of undeclared currencies. NB: I presume propaganda is not threatened by the crack down - the closest thing to a trip to North Korea I ever experienced was not in the DMZ, but in a restaurant where patrons fully dressed in NK army uniforms karaoked on a song to the Dear Leader before the dinner.
• XI Jinping seems definitely more open to collaboration with the South and the West than HU Jintao, a hardliner I considered more sympathetic to Northeastern Project / "Hanschluss"**** approaches. XI's past in the US is well documented, but we only recently learned that he'd met PARK Geun-hye back in 2005, a meeting that wouldn't have happened hadn't a PARK aide told her this Zhejiang official was likely to become the next top guy. XI wanted to know more about the Saemaeul movement, but PARK seized the opportunity to raise the North Korean issue, saying China should reconsider its position versus the regime.

3) A united front, now - a game changer?

In a perfectly orchestrated way, key messages have just been issued by China, South Korea, and the US:

• For the first time, China agreed to join multinational maritime drill next year, along with the US, South Korea, or Japan. In spite of all other geopolitical and territorial tensions in the region. Sixty years after the Korean War, that's really big.
• For the first time, South Korea and the US have exposed their counterattack plan. Korea would lead, and the US add their forces only if needed. They've been very specific when they mentioned the "provocations" that would lead to a full-fledged response: "violation of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime border; shelling the northernmost islands in South Korea’s Yellow Sea; infiltration by low-flying fighter jets into the South’s territory; infiltration by special forces of North Korea through the front-line units; surgical clashes between the two Koreas near the Military Demarcation Line; and torpedoing South Korean submarines" (see "U.S., South agree on joint counterattack" - Korea JoongAng Daily 20130325). IMHO that's too specific: technically, NK can still harpoon South Korean submarines. Likewise, now that KOR/US have pledged to destroy statues of KIM Il-sung and KIM Jong-il across the nation as priority targets to send the message to the population that regime change has come, you can be sure flocks of human shields will "spontaneously" wrap themselves around the effigies of their "beloved" tyrants.

More than ever, China holds the key. And KIM Jong-un has no choice but to negociate. He shot his last dud with his last nuclear trial ("Release the NKraken"), but the more he waits, the more surely he'll fall.

Time for the Nukie Monster to consider an exile from the Kermit Kingdom to Rodmanistan?


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* presumably from North Korea, following a supposed "false flag": Pyongyang claimed to be victim of a cyber attack from Seoul and Washington.
** see for instance "How N.Korean Diplomats Launder Counterfeit Money"
*** Note that neither Russia nor China had their say in the recent creation of a human rights commission, which will build the case against North Korea abuses, a potential first step towards the International Criminal Court which may help members of the elite up North distance themselves from the most rotten apples.
**** see for instance "China-North Korea : the Great Hanschluss still the base case scenario"

Hell is other Democratic People's Republic of Korea

I attended an invigorating book launch at the Asan Institute yesterday: the Korean edition of "No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security", by Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution Jonathan D. Pollack. Much more people turned out than for the launch of the previous day, precisely from North Korea (an ICBM? a satellite? a bird? a plane? Superkim? a UFO?).

Jonathan D. Pollack with Asan Institute President Hahm Chaibong

Pollack titled his book - which I haven't read so far - after Jean-Paul Sartre's play, "No Exit" - which I read so far in the past my memory of it is as wall-eyed as the existentialist author. Note that Sartre's original title, "Huis Clos", literally means "in camera", an expression that generally refers to trials behind close doors, where neither the press nor the public are allowed.

To add to the resemblance to North Korea, the characters in the play are bracing for torture and mistreatments. Except they're already dead. Anyway, they realize that actual hell, and the worse torture that could ever be inflicted to them, was facing themselves through the prism of judgement from fellow human beings. "Hell is other people".

Of course, the North Korean regime is rather "survivalist" than "existentialist", more into "appearance" than into "being", and certainly more into "nail-pulling autocracy" than into "hair-splitting philosophy".

And of course, our expert in Asia-Pacific studies didn't write a play. But he tried to decypher the intriguing tragicomedy North Korea has been playing over the past decades by empathically browsing through the regime's own words and actions, cold war archives, propaganda material, testimonies...

Like most observers, Pollack is at the same time appalled and fascinated by this country that "defies the laws of economic and political gravity", convinced that it won't last, conscious of the fact that China's influence has considerably grown over the past few years, and sure that South Korea as well as the US could do much better than what they've been doing so far.

When the  says "our toolkit failed", Pollack naturally refers to failed policies, not just to the latest intel fiasco (the rocket launch occured just hours following Seoul declarations that reparations would delay it for at least a couple of days). He also denounces the risks of underestimating or overestimating, and the tendency to portray the North Korean regime as a simple caricature*.

Ideally, the US and China should sit down and sort things out together, but that sounds a bit optimistic considering the go game they're playing across the region. I'm not sure this latest missile launch is the potential game changer Professor Georgy D. Toloraya wished it could become, but I think Russia does have a very interesting card to play because it's not caught in that gridlock, and because it's got the best potential win-lose ratio among the six parties.

I won't state again my positions about North Korea, my base case "Hanschluss Scenario" et al, but as is the tradition following a conference on the issue**, I'll drop my two KRW into the pig bank, this time with a focus on this program that has never been about civil nukes, never quite fully been about military nukes, and could even be lampooned as being about dynastic / familial nukes.

1) Nukes remain the ultimate proof of concept for the Incredible Shrinking State of Kimland:

The Juche ideology failed, the propaganda failed, and the country's leaders have become laughingstocks even at home. The only story that somewhat keeps standing is the nuclear / space program. As if Sun-God KIM Il-sung had achieved His ultimate mutation, now radiating across the globe for the next hundred thousand years and beyond. As if nuclear deterrence were the perfection of Juche. As if the recurrent tales about nuclear and space progresses were the proof that propaganda is not just an empty shell.

The nuclear nation status is key to the regime's legitimacy and allows North Korea, as Pollack puts it, "to punch above its weight" at the international level. Nothing new under the sun, but South Koreans sure didn't like the way their brothers batted their gizmo into orbit at the very moment their own Naro rocket was sent back to disabled list.

2) Can you expect the NK regime to renounce this program without renouncing its very existence?

Unless the rules of the game are changed, the regime will keep posting every now and then nasty status updates on its Facebook wall.

But such statements are costly, and the country's limited resources have been stretched very far. And North Korea can only count on its friends up to a certain point. China puts thumbs down to anything involving nuclear tests, and Tehran is not much more than Pyongyang the picture of a sustainable regime.

Furthermore, managing such a program demands in itself an ever increasing level of organization, not very compatible with a leadership stripped bare to its smallest circles and alienating even within military ranks. Nukes actually give the perfect alibi to distance oneself from a leadership that choses a universal repellent over the country. Building the nation around the nuclear fortress is actually dismantling the nation, separating even more the regime from its propellers.

If the North Korean regime doesn't renounce the program, North Korean elites will eventually renounce the regime - unless one of the regime's last friends steps in and does it all by itself.

Maybe this nuclear program should be named after that other work of Sartre's, "Being and nothingness".


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* (UPDATE 20121215) I fully agree, but without caricature, where's the fun? Speaking of toolkit and North Korean watch, and on an even lighter note, here's my embarrassing take at the most strategic question raised by this "ICBM" launch: "how to wear binoculars properly?"

(for those who are not familiar by that other terrible blog of mine, "blogules" are self-proclaimed "Weapons of Mass Disinformation" - history proves politics and nukes are too important issues to be handled by or handed to serious people)

** see for instance:
. "Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk" (following the North Korea Policy Forum conference "Responding to the Consolidation of Economic Cooperation between North Korea and China", 2011/04/11)
. "NK and nukes: back to the (dolsot curling) stone age?" (following the Asia Institute Seminar "Revisiting Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security in North Korea" 2012/03/22)

Wonsu me

Two days after the "removal" of top brass RI Yong-ho (see "Pyongyang's Fairy Tales"), KIM Jong-un has officially been named "Wonsu", some sort of a Super-Marshal. To make that possible, Daddy KIM Jong-il had to be posthumously promoted to "Dae Wonsu", the Capo di tutti capi military-wise, a position only KIM Il-sung claimed before.

Definitely in the fast lane to NK Army superstardom ever since KIM The Second had his stroke, KIM The Third theoretically controls the main powerhouse, but it had to happen sooner or later. Even if the lad doesn't even know how to hold a pair of binoculars correctly.

Whoever calls the shots in Pyongyang or Beijing, it's also about conveying the message that the dynasty is not dilluted but strengthened: KIM 3 must not be perceived as a mere KIM 2's "mini-me", KIM 2 himself having been sold as a KIM 1 "mini-me". Jong-un is Il-sung reincarnated, and as we saw earlier, the physical resemblance has been cleverly crafted.

Of course, the real news is the fact that RI's fate was decided by the party, a serious challenge to the 'military first' doctrine. The country's few cash machines are expected to be diverted towards different pockets, probably among Pyongyang nomenklatura circles.

That's very risky for the regime, which doesn't control the rest of the country very well. And you don't want to keep the North Korean army angry at you. Let's see if the new Wonsu can survive 2012.


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KIM Jong-il passes. To KIM Jong-un. Presumably.

So as expected, KIM Jong-il died. A bit early to secure the transition with KIM Jong-un, who might be tempted to show his skills to those who doubt he's got whatever that is North Korean leaders are supposed to have.

Physically, Junior already used plastic surgery to improve his Kimilsungist looks, let's hope he won't try to sport his dad's weirdo hairdo now.

Character-wise, Jong-un is rumored to be more ill-tempered than his brothers Jong-nam and Jong-chol, respectively a Disneyland and an Eric Clapton fan. But compared to the Late Dear Leader, he's more permeated with such capitalist perversions as burgers. And it starts showing, particularly in a country where the population is maintained in a constant state of starvation.

As far as leadership is concerned, Jong-un didn't quite pass the cut last year: the young lad has been credited with the latest attack on South Korean soil but doesn't seem much of an expert, judging by the way he uses binoculars...

So we'll follow KIM Jong-il's funerals (after four weddings, Hugh can grant him that*). And eminent Pyeongyangologists will watch closely: who will keep a seat when the music stops? Isn't CHANG Sung-taek a trifle too old for musical chairs? Will Beijing-friendly people get promoted in the army**?

In South Korea, a North Korean Spring or Winter would have consequences for the 2012 elections: more tensions could become a problem for AHN Cheol-soo (commander in chief beyond cyberwars?), and boost conservatives, but not necessarily PARK Geun-hye (would Koreans vote for a woman in times of crisis, and one used to operating only behind the scenes at that?).

By the way. This week-end, LEE Myung-bak visited Japan, and devoted the bulk of his talks with Yoshihiko Noda to the issue of Japanese military sexual slavery, following Wednesday's successful demonstration (see "One Thousand Wednesdays"). But if he's consistent, the President must also reactivate the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: every country must face its own past, particularly when it expects the same from its neighbors.


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* the movie was released in 1994, the year KIM The First died

**... and the invisible 'hanschluss' continue? see "Re-engaging North Korea - A Four Party Talk", and previous posts about NK

N.K. 3.0 rebooted - and relocated

Kim Jong-il allegedly brought his son and designated successor Kim Jong-un to his own father's school in China (Kim Il-sung attended the Yuwen Middle School in Changchun, Jilin).

This "pilgrimage" is of course meant to restate the dynasty*, but also to appease Beijing : it looks as if the KIM Trilogy found its very legitimacy in "the motherland"... in other words, yet another confirmation that the North Korean regime are selling their own country to their big neighbors in exchange for their survival**.

OK. Maybe the People's Liberation Army hasn't come back to Pyeongyang yet. But it's already venturing into other neighboring countries. Last stop ? Pakistanese Kashmir***.

Seoul Village 2010

* see today's S.K. press, ie "Kim Jong-il pilgrimages in China’s Changchun" (JoongAng Daily)
** see previous episodes, including "after the Cheonan tragedy, the Juche, Sunshine, or China Line ?", "Kim Jong-il's bridge to nowhere"...
*** "China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands"

After the Cheonan Tragedy : the Juche, Sunshine, or China Line ?

I've been often asked what I thought about the sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean navy ship, presumably by a North Korean torpedo.

The Cheonan tragedy logically raised the issue of succession wars around the ailing KIM Jong-il, who himself played similar nasty tricks to secure his daddy's job (back then, a commercial plane destroyed).

Actually, I mostly consider it as collateral damage from internal tensions within North Korea, between the usual 3 main local lobbies, and particularly the first two :
- what I call the "Juche Line" : die-hard partisans of independence from China, Russia, and of course Western powers starting with the "puppet regimes" down South. From KIM Il-sung to KIM Jong-il, the path has narrowed to a dead end and the position is absolutely not sustainable. The "strategy" or lack of can be summed up as "tricks and treats" : show me the money / dough / rice or else...
- the "China Line" : collaborators for whom the only sustainable way for NK regime is to sell the country to China, play their infamous Northeastern Project, accept their Hanschluss (see for instance "Great Wall of China - Anschlussing Korea (continued)")
- the (shrinking) "Sunshine Line" : "doves" (or the closest breed you can find that side of the DMZ) for whom the best case scenario would be a reunification with the South in the long term, with small and careful steps on the way, and a progressive evolution of NK politics, economics, and society.

Over the past few years, the change has been spectacular : the LEE Myung-bak government put an end to the Sunshine Policy, putting Jucheists off balance, but precipitating North Korea altogether into the arms of Beijing.

The Cheonan incident confirmed the trend, with very significant changes :
- new tone in Beijing, new vocabulary : a cold reception for KIM Jong-il, and a way of presenting North Korean issues as internal affairs. De facto, North Korea is now considered as a part of China, its rulers must report to Beijing, Beijing is legitimate for everything regarding national politics and security.
- tighter economic ties have been knotted between Beijing and Pyeongyang to compensate for the ones severed with the South.
- the trip of CHANG Sung-taek and KIM Jong-un one year ago in China was obviously very profitable for Beijing : KIM Jong-il's brother in law and son apparently joined the "China Line", isolating more than ever the ailing dictator. CHANG lost a rival in a convenient car accident and created an alternate FDI agency visibly very pro-China, and the now official heir apparent seems to be willing to play the role the big neighbor expected him to play : a DENG Xiaoping-like reformer moving the country (sorry : "the region") closer to "motherland" China.

Meanwhile, in the South, ultra-conservatives fuel mutual hatred on which they thrive, misusing the 60th anniversary of the war and the 100th anniversary of the Japanese rule to actually undermine the nation and help their counterparts in China and Japan. Uncle Sam ? The US want "no drama" in the area, and some would almost be glad to leave it up to China instead of risking more commercial skirmishes. The US-SK joint navy operations, initially planned in the Yellow Sea, have been diplomatically moved to the other side of the peninsula. Gates and Clinton are to visit the DMZ today.

Sadly, the Cheonan tragedy is about North Korean internal politics or, as seen from China, Chinese internal politics.

I don't think now is the time to reactivate the Sunshine Policy as it was, but severing the few positive links was definitely an ideal gift to China.

Seoul Village 2010

Korean War : a photo exhibition at Cheonggyecheon

Don't get fooled by the UN flag : a highly conservative "freedom" movement is behind the photo exhibition on Cheonggyecheon Plaza which, instead of promoting peace and progress, too often radiates pure resentment and hatred.

Don't get me wrong :
- here is an interesting exhibition about key episodes of the Korean War (until March 18)
- that tragedy was started by the North
- Korea can thank the UN and all the countries who helped save not only half the peninsula, but also more than a few Northeners who refused to subscribe to Kim Il-sung's agenda (including NK POWs, who overwhelmingly opted for the South after 1953)

It's just that the not so subtle propaganda trickling down every other panel (along with a persistant rain that day) almost ruins the visit. And instead of Confucian wisdom and hope, the final message ("Never changed") exudes blind anger. It can be summed up like this : stop talking to North Koreans, they still want to get South Korea, and there will never be peace with such obtuse and stubborn people (I second that : peace is not likely to happen with this kind of dangerous ultra-radicals in Seoul to face that kind of dangerous ultra-radicals in Pyeongyang).

So it's a little bit like visiting Seodaemun Prison : you only have one side of the coin, a clumsily edited good v. evil, black-and-white fairyscarytale. There, you learn a lot about the horrors perpetrated for decades by Japanese torturers, but not one single word is written about the abuses that followed, perpetrated for many long years by the Korean government (as if you wrote the final book about Abu Ghraib without mentioning the post-Saddam mess). Here, you can expect many lyrical digressions about religion, but certainly not the full picture of a really nasty civil war (yeah, I know : all wars are nasty, and all civil wars are even nastier).

The only way to fix things and to prevent such tragedies from happening again is to promote truth and reconciliation, not to maintain obsolete propagandas and censorships. Praise the heroes yes, but please show some respect for innocent victims from all sides.

Ultra-conservatives will probably consider this exhibition a success because it exposes in the most direct fashion their basic points of view to the face of the world. Unfortunately for them, just like their attempt to silence the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, this exhibition backfires and eventually exposes their imposture, sending the worst possible message to foreign visitors : not only North Korea is not changing, but some retrograde people in South Korea still refuse to see their own country become a great nation, and only manage to bring more shame upon themselves.

As a French citizen, I am very much humbled by the courage of countrymen who fought for peace and freedom in Korea, but ashamed to see the tricolore flag associated with such an agenda.

Seoul Village 2010

* see "TRCK lost in translation or lost in transition ?"